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WILL WOMEN JUDGES REALLY MAKE
A DIFFERENCE?©
By MADAME JUSTICE BERTHA WILSON*
When I was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Spring of 1982, a great many women from all across the country
telephoned, cabled, or wrote to me rejoicing in my appointment.
"Now," they said, "we are represented on Canada's highest court.
This is the beginning of a new era for women." So why was I not
rejoicing? Why did I not share the tremendous confidence of these
women?
First came the realization that no one could live up to the
expectations of my well-wishers. I had the sense of being doomed
to failure, not because of any excess of humility on my part or any
desire to shirk the responsibility of the office, but because I knew
from hard experience that the law does not work that way. Change
in the law comes slowly and incrementally; that is its nature. It
responds to changes in society; it seldom initiates them. And while
I was prepared - and, indeed, as a woman judge, anxious - to
respond to these changes, I wondered to what extent I would be
constrained in my attempts to do so by the nature of judicial office
itself.
In the literature which is required reading for every newly
appointed judge, it is repeatedly stated that judges must be both
independent and impartial, that these qualities are basic to the
proper administration of justice and fundamental to the legitimacy
of the judicial role. The judge must not approach his or her task
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with preconceived notions about law or policy, with personal
prejudice against parties or issues, or with bias toward a particular
outcome of a case. Socrates defined the essential qualities of a
judge in the following manner: "Four things belong to a judge: to
hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide
impartially."1
In Winters' Handbook for Judges,2 there is a section devoted
to the essential qualities of a judge; these are defined as integrity
and independence, impartiality, flexibility, creativity, responsibility,
and common sense. The late Justice Frankfurter was quoted as
stating:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt
demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that
one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But
these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely
the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with ... judicial
power.3
In his article "The Virtue of Impartiality," the late Judge
Shientag (of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court) discusses the difficulty in attaining impartiality and states that
the term implies an appreciation and understanding of the differing
attitudes and viewpoints of those involved in a controversy. 4  He
quotes Lord MacMillan's description of the difficulty judges face in
this regard:
The judicial oath of office imposes on the judge a lofty duty of impartiality. But
impartiality is not easy of attainment. For a judge does not shed the attributes of
common humanity when he assumes the ermine. The ordinary human mind is a
mass of prepossessions inherited and acquired, often none the less dangerous
because unrecognized by their possessor. Few minds are as neutral as a sheet of
plate glass, and indeed a mind of that quality may actually fail in judicial efficiency,
1 J.K. Hoyt, The Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations, rev'd ed. (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1896) at 330.
2 G.R. Winters, ed., Handbook for Judges (The American Judicature Society, 1975).
3 As quoted in L.R. Yankwich, 'The Art of Being a Judge' in Winters, ibid, at 4.
4 B.L. Shientag, 'The Virtue of Impartiality" in Winters, ibid at 57-64.
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for the warmer tints of imagination and sympathy are needed to temper the cold
light of reason if human justice is to be done.5
Later, Lord MacMillan issues the following warning: "[The judge]
must purge his mind not only of partiality to persons, but of
partiality to arguments, a much more subtle matter, for every legal
mind is apt to have an innate susceptibility to particular classes of
arguments."
6
Many have criticised as totally unreal the concept that judges
are somehow superhuman, neutral, above politics and unbiased, and
are able to completely separate themselves from their personal
opinions and predispositions when exercising their judicial function.
For example, Lord Justice Scrutton doubted that complete
impartiality was possible. He said:
This is rather difficult to attain in any system. I am not speaking of conscious
impartiality; but tile habits you are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead
to your having a certain class of ideas of such a nature that, when you have to deal
with other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate judgments as you would
wish. This is one of the great difficulties at present with Labour. Labour says:
"Where are your impartial Judges? They all move in the same circle as the
employers, and they are all educated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers.
How can a labour man or a trade unionist get impartial justice?" It is very difficult
sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position
between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your class. Even in
matters outside trade-unionist cases ... it is sometimes difficult to be sure, hard as
you have tried, that you have put yourself in a perfectly impartial position between
tile two litigants.
7
In his text, The Politics of the Judiciary,8 Professor Griffith
caused a furor in legal and judicial circles in the United Kingdom
when he questioned whether the English judiciary were capable of
impartiality. He stated that for a judge to be completely impartial,
he or she would have to be like a political, economic, and social
eunuch and have no interests in the world outside the court.
Because this is impossible, Griffith concludes that impartiality is an
5 ]bid at 62.
6 bid
7 Scrutton L.J., 'The Work of the Commercial Courts" (1921) 1 Camb. .U. 6 at 8.
8 J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester. Manchester University Press,
1977).
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ideal incapable of realization.9 He says of the English judiciary:
"These judges have by their education and training and the pursuit
of their profession as barristers, acquired a strikingly homogeneous
collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to them
represents the public interest."10 The public interest, in other words,
is perceived from the viewpoint of their own class. Chief Justice
Nemetz has suggested that Professor Griffith's views may have some
validity in Canada too, more particularly, Professor Griffith's view
that judicial attitudes towards political and social issues reflect the
lack of a proper understanding of the view of labour unions,
minorities, and the underprivileged.!'
Judge Rosalie Abella (Chair of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission) also doubts that judicial impartiality is a realistic
requirement. In her article "The Dynamic Nature of Equality," she
emphasizes that "[e]very decisionmaker who walks into a courtroom
to hear a case is armed not only with the relevant legal texts, but
with a set of values, experiences and assumptions that are thoroughly
embedded. 12
Judge Shientag refers to the fact that many judges believe
that they have acted with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
when, in fact, they have completely failed to examine their prejudices
and biases. He points out that the partiality and prejudice with
which we are concerned is not overt, not something tangible on
which the judge can put his or her finger. Yet by failing to
appreciate this, many judges are lulled into a false sense of
security./3 Judge Shientag emphasizes that progress will be made
only when judges recognize this condition as part of the weakness
of human nature. Then, "[h]aving admitted the liability to prejudice,
unconscious for the most part, subtle and nebulous at times, the next
9 Ibid. at 189-92.
10 Ibid at 193.
11 Nemetz C.J.B.C., 'The Concept'of an Independent Judiciary" (1986) 20 U.B.C. L. Rev.
286 at 290.
12 R.S. Abella, 'The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in S. Martin & K. Mahoney, eds,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 3 at 8-9.
13 Shientag, supra, note 4 at 57.
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step is to determine what the judge, with his trained mind, can do
to neutralize the incessant play of these obscure yet potent
influences. "14 Judge Shientag concludes that
the judge who realizes, before listening to a case, that all men have a natural bias
of mind and that thought is apt to be coloured by predilection, is more likely to
make a conscientious effort at impartiality and dispassionateness than one who
believes that his elevation to the bench makes him at once the dehumanized
instrument of infallible logical truth.Z5
But what has all this got to do with the subject: "Will
women judges really make a difference?" It has a great deal to do
with it, and whether you agree or not will probably depend on your
perception of the degree to which the existing law reflects the
judicial neutrality or impartiality we have been discussing. If the
existing law can be viewed as the product of judicial neutrality or
impartiality, even although the judiciary has been very substantially
male, then you may conclude that the advent of increased numbers
of women judges should make no difference, assuming, that is, that
these women judges will bring to bear the same neutrality and
impartiality. However, if you conclude that the existing law, in some
areas at least, cannot be viewed as the product of judicial neutrality,
then your answer may be very different.
Two law professors at New York University, Professor John
Johnston and Professor Charles Knapp, have concluded, as a result
of their studies of judicial attitudes reflected in the decisions of
judges in the United States, that United States judges have
succeeded in their conscious efforts to free themselves from habits
of stereotypical thought with regard to discrimination based on
colour. 6 However, they were unable to reach a similar conclusion
with respect to discrimination based on sex, finding that American
judges had failed to bring to sex discrimination the judicial virtues of
detachment, reflection, and critical analysis which had served them
so well with respect to other areas of discrimination. They state:
"'Sexism' - the making of unjustified (or at least unsupported)
14 ]bid. at 58.
1 5 1bid
16 J.D. Johnston & C.L. Knapp, "Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective' (1976) 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675.
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assumptions about individual capabilities, interests, goals and social
roles solely on the basis of sex differences - is as easily discernible
in contemporary judicial opinions as racism ever was. ' 17
Professor Norma Wikler, a sociologist at the University of
California, has reviewed a number of other studies of judicial
attitudes conducted by legal researchers and social scientists. These
studies confirm that male judges tend to adhere to traditional values
and beliefs about the natures of men and women and their proper
roles in society. The studies show overwhelming evidence that
gender-based myths, biases, and stereotypes are deeply embedded in
the attitudes of many male judges, as well as in the law itself.
Researchers have concluded that gender difference has been a
significant factor in judicial decision-making, particularly in the areas
of tort law, criminal law, and family law. Further, many have
concluded that sexism is the unarticulated underlying premise of
many judgments in these areas, and that this is not really surprising
having regard to the nature of the society in which the judges
themselves have been socialized.18
A number of strategies have been tried in the United States
to eliminate gender bias from the courts - legislative reform,
enhanced legal representation of women litigants, increased numbers
of women lawyers and judges. These measures have been
accompanied by an intensive educational program aimed at judges
right across the country. Women judges and women lawyers in the
United States played a very active role in the creation of this
program. They were able to persuade substantial numbers of their
male peers that gender bias, like all other forms of bias they had
worked so hard to eradicate, violated the core principle of judicial
impartiality and neutrality and posed an increasing threat in the
1970s and 1980s to the maintenance of public confidence in the
judiciary.
As might be anticipated, a direct frontal attack on gender
bias in the courts, and especially the institution of an educational
program for judges on this subject, was highly controversial. It
17 Ibid. at 676.
18 N.J. Wikler, "On the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal Treatment for Men and
Women in the Courts" (1980) 64 Jud. 202.
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would probably have died on the vine but for the support of a
substantial number of the country's leading male judges and
educators who recognized that profound changes were taking place
in society, including a major redefinition of the roles of men and
women.
Professor Wilder has been one of the moving forces behind
the United States program to sensitize judges to the problem of
gender bias. She reports some modest indicators of success of the
program, although she acknowledges that it is too early to assess the
long-term effects. She reports that requests for speakers and
material generated from courses and workshops indicate a growing
interest in the program, as does the positive evaluation by judges
themselves of the courses presented. Even more gratifying, attorneys
practising in states where the program has been actively promoted
report a noticeable increase in judicial sensitivity to gender bias.
Program materials have been cited in the courts and quoted in the
judgments. Judicial conduct commissions are disciplining judges for
gender biased behaviour, such as sexist remarks to women lawyers
and litigants and inappropriate comments in rape cases. Professor
Wikler concludes that one very important goal has been achieved:
gender bias is now a subject which judges and judicial educators
think and care about.19
Another development in the United States has been the
establishment of judicially appointed task forces to investigate the
extent to which gender bias exists in the judiciary. The first of these
task forces was created in New Jersey in 1982. As stated by Chief
Justice Wilentz, it was mandated to "investigate the extent to which
gender bias exists in the New Jersey judicial branch, and to develop
an educational program to eliminate any such bias."20 Since 1982,
over twenty other states have created task forces. In her article
"The Success of the American Program," Lynn Hecht Schafran
reports that the task forces have "significantly enhanced judicial
19 NJ. Wikler, "Identifying and Correcting Judicial Gender Bias" in Martin & Mahoney,
supra, note 12 at 12.
20 As quoted in L.H. Schafran, 'The Success of the American Program" in Martin &
Mahoney, ibid at 412.
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education programs and created a level of public awareness that
generates its own pressures for reform."21
Schafran identifies four reasons why a judicially appointed
task force is important, as opposed to other groups outside the court
system focussing on particular concerns. First, a gender bias task
force is able to look at a broad range of issues and demonstrate a
pattern of gender bias that manifests itself throughout the judicial
system. The second reason concerns credibility. Schafran explains
this critical reason in the following manner:
When a coalition of rape crisis counsellors asserts that rape victims are ill treated
in court, or a women's bar association claims that women attorneys are denied a
fair share of appointments to challenging and lucrative civil and criminal cases, these
charges are heard as the claims of special interest groups. When a blue ribbon
panel appointed by a state's chief justice makes these same charges, people listen.
There was little in what the New Jersey and New York Task Forces reported that
numerous women's rights organization and feminist legal commentators have not
been saying for years, but the task force reports twice made the front page of the
New York Times.
2 2
The third reason relates to the administration of the task
force. The Chief Justice of the state is in a position to authorize
funds, compel co-operation, endorse and propose reforms and ensure
their implementation, and support judicial education on the subject.
Finally, a task force brings together judges, lawyers, law professors,
and community activists to study an issue which many of them do
not initially appreciate is an issue at all. Schafran reports that task
force members from New Jersey and New York "who start out with
no knowledge of gender bias in the courts, or even a conviction that
the idea is nonsense, emerge from the data collection process
convinced that the problem is real and has deeply serious
implications for the administration of justice."23
So, where do we stand in Canada on this matter? As might
be expected, feminist scholars in Canada have over the past two
decades produced a vast quantity of literature on the subject, some
of it very insightful, very balanced, and very useful, and some of it
very radical, quite provocative, and probably less useful as a result.
21 Ibid. at 412-13.
22 Ibid. at 413-14.
23 Ibid. at 414.
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But all of it, it seems, is premised, at least as far as judicial decision-
making is concerned, on two basic propositions: one, that women
view the world and what goes on in it from a different perspective
from men; and two, that women judges, by bringing that perspective
to bear on the cases they hear, can play a major role in introducing
judicial neutrality and impartiality into the justice system.
Taking from my own experience as a judge of fourteen years'
standing, working closely with my male colleagues on the bench,
there are probably whole areas of the law on which there is no
uniquely feminine perspective. This is not to say that the
development of the law in these areas has not been influenced by
the fact that lawyers and judges have all been men. Rather, the
principles and the underlying premises are so firmly entrenched and
so fundamentally sound that no good would be achieved by
attempting to re-invent the wheel, even if the revised version did
have a few more spokes in it. I have in mind areas such as the law
of contract, the law of real property, and the law applicable to
corporations. In some other areas of the law, however, a distinctly
male perspective is clearly discernible. It has resulted in legal
principles that are not fundamentally sound and that should be
revisited when the opportunity presents itself. Canadian feminist
scholarship has done an excellent job of identifying those areas and
making suggestions for reform. Some aspects of the criminal law in
particular cry out for change; they are based on presuppositions
about the nature of women and women's sexuality that, in this day
and age, are little short of ludicrous.
But how do we handle the problem that women judges, just
as much as their male counterparts, are subject to the duty of
impartiality? As was said at the outset, judges must not approach
their task with preconceived notions about law and policy. They
must approach it with detachment and, as Lord MacMillan said,
purge their minds "not only of partiality to persons, but of partiality
to arguments."'24 Does this then foreclose any kind of "judicial
affirmative action" to counteract the influence of the dominant male
perspective of the past and establish judicial neutrality through a
countervailing female perspective? Is Karen Selick, writing recently
24 Shientag, supra, note 4 at 62.
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in the Lawyers Weekly, correct when she argues that offsetting male
bias with female bias would only be compounding the injustice?25
Does the nature of the judicial process itself present an insuperable
hurdle so that the legislatures rather than the courts must be looked
to for any significant legal change?
In part this may be so. Certainly, the legislature is the more
effective instrument for rapid or radical change. But there is no
reason why the judiciary cannot exercise some modest degree of
creativity in areas where modern insights and life's experience have
indicated that the law has gone awry. However, and this is
extremely important, it will be a Pyrrhic victory for women and for
the justice system as a whole if changes in the law come only
through the efforts of women lawyers and women judges. The
Americans were smart to realize that courses and workshops on
gender bias for judges, male and female, are an essential follow-up
to scholarly research and learned writing. In Canada, we are just
beginning to touch the fringes.
The first national, interdisciplinary conference on the
relationship between judicial neutrality and gender equality was held
in Banff, Alberta in May 1986. At the conference, judges,
academics, practising lawyers, and experts in anthropology, political
science, sociology, and social welfare examined judicial behaviour in
equality related matters. The judicial acceptance of traditional
stereotypes concerning women was noted, as well as its impact in
Canada on important areas of constitutional equality litigation, family
law, criminal law, tort law, and human rights.26
Mr. Justice Rothman of the Quebec Court of Appeal, one
of the speakers at the conference, endorsed the approach adopted
in the United States to counteract gender bias through nation-wide
educational programs for judges and the creation of judicial task
forces. In his perception, women face the same kind of
discrimination in Canada as they do in the United States, and we
should be working to change the old attitudes now. He suggested
that conferences and seminars for newly appointed judges would be
25 K. Selick, "Adding More Women Won't End Bias in Justice System" (1990) 9:35
Lawyer's Weekly 7 at 7.
26 "Preface" in Martin & Mahoney, supra, note 12 at iii-iv.
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a good place to start, but in addition, courses on gender bias should
be part of the continuing education programs for judges at all stages
of their careers. Justice Rothman added that it is not going to be
enough to sensitize judges to equality issues if lawyers are not
sensitized to them as well.27
The Canadian Judicial Council and the Canadian Judicial
Centre have both recognized the need for judicial education in this
area and will include gender issues in their summer seminars for
judges this year. I understand that the Centre hopes to subsequently
present the program in a number of locations across the country,
and the course materials will be available to all Canadian judges. I
heartily endorse this initiative. It is a significant first step towards
the achievement of true judicial neutrality. But it is only a first step
and there is a long way to go.
I return, then, to the question of whether the appointment
of more women judges will make a difference. Because the entry of
women into the judiciary is so recent, few studies have been done
on the subject. Current statistics show that just over 9 percent of
federally appointed judges are women;28 it is reasonable to assume
that more women will be appointed to the Bench as more women
become licensed to practice law. Will this growing number of
women judges by itself make a difference?
The expectation is that it will, that the mere presence of
women on the bench will make a difference. In her article "The
Gender of Judges," Suzanna Sherry (an Associate Law Professor at
the University of Minnesota) suggests that the mere fact that women
are judges serves an educative function; it helps to shatter
stereotypes about the role of women in society that are held by male
judges and lawyers, as well as by litigants, jurors, and witnesses.29
Judge Gladys Kessler (former President of the National
Association of Women Judges in the United States) defends the
search for competent women appointees to the bench. She says:
27 M.L. Rothman, "Prospects for Change in Canada: Education for Judges and Lawyers"
in Martin & Mahoney, ibid at 421-27.
28 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Profile of Courts in Canada, 1987-1988 (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1989).
29 S. Sherry, "he Gender of Judges" (1986) 4 Law & Inequality 159 at 160.
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"But the ultimate justification for deliberately seeking judges of both
sexes and all colors and backgrounds is to keep the public's trust.
The public must perceive its judges as fair, impartial and
representative of the diversity of those who are being judged."30
Justice Wald has expressed similar sentiments. She believes that
women judges are indispensable to the public's confidence in the
ability of the courts to respond to the legal problems of all classes
of citizens.31
Dianne Martin, a criminal lawyer writing in the Lawyers
Weekly, sees another way in which the presence of women on the
bench is helpful and constructive. It is easier, she says, for women
lawyers to appear as counsel before a woman judge. She says the
"difference is that you are 'normal' - you and the judge have certain
shared experiences and a shared reality that removes, to a certain
extent, the need to 'translate' your submissions into 'man talk' or a
context that a male judge will understand."32 The woman judge does
not see you as "out of place" or having "something to prove by
appearing in a courtroom arguing a case before her."33
For women counsel, appearing in front of a woman judge
also decreases the risk of sexist comments and inappropriate efforts
at humour. The courtroom treatment of women litigants, witnesses,
and lawyers was examined by the New Jersey and New York task
forces. The New York Task Force on Women in the Courts found
that "[w]omen uniquely, disproportionately, and with unacceptable
frequency must endure a climate of condescension, indifference, and
hostility."34 The New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women
in the Courts found strong evidence that women are often treated
differently in courtrooms, in judges' chambers, and at professional
30 As quoted in J.E. Scott, "Women on the Illinois State Court Bench" (1986) 74 I1. B.J.
436 at 438.
31 P.M. Wald, "Women in the Law" (1988) 24:11 Trial 75 at 80.
32 D. Martin, "Have Women Judges Really Made a Difference?" (1986) 6:14 Lawyers
Weekly 5 at 5.
33 Ibid
34 Schafran, supra, note 20 at 419.
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gatherings.!s As Justice Rothman pointed out at the Banff
conference, there is "no possible excuse for a judge allowing himself
or anyone else in his courtroom to make unprofessional or
inappropriate references to gender." He saw as a possible solution
the appointment of more women judges and more courteous and
sensitive male judges.36
Some feminist writers are persuaded that the appointment of
more women judges will have an impact on the process of judicial
decision-making itself and on the development of the substantive
law. As was mentioned earlier, this flows from the belief that
women view the world and what goes on in it from a different
perspective from men. Some define the difference in perspective
solely in terms that women do not accept male perceptions and
interpretations of events as the norm or as objective reality. Carol
Gilligan (a Professor of Education at Harvard University) sees the
difference as going much deeper than that. In her view, women
think differently from men, particularly in responding to moral
dilemmas. They have, she says, different ways of thinking about
themselves and their relationships to others.37
In her book In a Different Voice,38 Gilligan analyses data she
collected, in the form of responses from male and female
participants, in a number of different studies. These responses, she
submits, support her central thesis that women see themselves as
essentially connected to others and as members of a community; men
see themselves as essentially autonomous and independent of others.
Gilligan makes no claim about the origins of the differences she
describes. She does, however, use the psychoanalytical work of Dr.
Nancy Chodorow as a starting point.3 9 Chodorow postulates that
gender differences arise from the fact that women do the mothering
of children. Because the gender identity of male children is not the
35 Ibid. at 415.
36 Rothman, supra, note 27 at 427.
37 See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Tzeory and Women's Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. at 8.
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same as their mothers, they tend to distance and separate themselves
from their mothers' female characteristics in order to develop their
masculinity. Female children, on the other hand, define themselves
through attachment to their mothers.40 Masculinity is therefore,
according to Giligan, defined through separation and individualism;
femininity is defined through attachment and the formation of
relationships. The gender identity of the male, she submits, is
threatened by relationshiys; the gender identity of the female is
threatened by separation.
Gilligan's work on conceptions of morality among adults
suggests that women's ethical sense is significantly different from
men's. Men see moral problems as arising from competing rights;
the adversarial process comes easily to them. Women see moral
problems as arising from competing obligations, the one to the other;
the important thing is to preserve relationships, to develop an ethic
of caring. The goal, according to women's ethical sense, is not seen
in terms of winning or losing but, rather, in terms of achieving an
optimum outcome for all individuals involved in the moral dilemma. 42
It is not difficult to see how this contrast in thinking might form the
basis of different perceptions of justice.
There is merit in Gilligan's analysis. In part, it may explain
the traditional reluctance of courts to get too deeply into the
circumstances of a case, their anxiety to reduce the context of the
dispute to its bare bones through a complex system of exclusionary
evidentiary rules. This is one of the characteristic features of the
adversarial process. We are all familiar with the witness on cross-
examination who wants to explain his or her answer, who feels that
a simple yes or no is not an adequate response, and who is
frustrated and angry at being cut off with a half-truth. It is so much
easier to come up with a black and white answer if you are
unencumbered by a broader context which might prompt you, in
40 N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of
Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) at 91, 167-70.
41 Gilligan, supra, note 37 at 8.
42 See, for example, ibid. at 16-18, 24-32, 163-65.
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Lord MacMillan's words, to temper the cold light of reason with the
warmer tints of imagination and sympathy.43
Gilligan's analysis may also explain the hostility of some male
judges to permitting intervenors in human rights cases. The main
purpose of having intervenors is to broaden the context of the
dispute, to show the issue in a larger perspective or as impacting on
other groups not directly involved in the litigation at all. But it
certainly does complicate the issues to have them presented in
polycentric terms.
Professor Patricia Cain, in her article "Good and Bad Bias:
A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging," says:
What we want, it seems to me, are lawyers who can tell their clients' story, lawyers
who can help judges to see the parties as human beings, and who can help remove
the separation between judge and litigant. And, then, what we want from our judges
is a special ability to listen with connection before engaging in the separation that
accompanies judgment 4 4
Obviously, this is not an easy role for the judge - to enter into the
skin of the litigant and make his or her experience part of your
experience and only when you have done that, to judge. But we
have to do it; or at least make an earnest attempt to do it.
Whether the criticism of the justice system comes to us through
Royal Commissions, through the media, or just through our own
personal friends, we cannot escape the conclusion that, in some
respects, our existing system of justice has been found wanting. And
as Mr. Justice Rothman says, the time to do something about it is
now.
One of the important conclusions emerging from the Council
of Europe's Seminar on Equality between Men and Women held in
Strasbourg last November is that the universalist doctrine of human
rights must include a realistic concept of masculine and feminine
humanity regarded as a whole, that human kind is dual and must be
represented in its dual form if the trap of an asexual abstraction in
which human being is always declined in the masculine is to be
43 Supra, note 4 at 62.
4 4 P.A. Cain, "Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging" (1988)
61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1945 at 1954.
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avoided.45 If women lawyers and women judges through their
differing perspectives on life can bring a new humanity to bear on
the decision-making process, perhaps they will make a difference.
Perhaps they will succeed in infusing the law with an understanding
of what it means to be fully human.
45 Council of Europe, Committee on Equality between Men and Women, The Democratic
Principle of Equal Representation - Forty Years of Council of Europe Activity (Seminar,
Strasbourg, 6-7 November 1989).
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